Fifth Amendment--Rights of Detainees by unknown
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 70
Issue 4 Winter Article 9
Winter 1979
Fifth Amendment--Rights of Detainees
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Fifth Amendment--Rights of Detainees, 70 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 482 (1979)
9901-4169/79/7004-0482$02.00/0
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 1979 by Northwestern University School of Law
FIFTH AMENDMENT-RIGHTS OF DETAINEES
Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
INTRODUCTION
In Bell v. Wolfish,' the United States Supreme
Court examined for the first time the question of
what protection the Constitution affords persons
being detained in prison pending trial.2 The Court
held that the pretrial detainee's right to liberty
under the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment prohibited the imposition of restrictions
amounting to punishment.3 A restriction would be
found to constitute punishment if it was not ration-
ally related to a legitimate government objective
or if a punitive intent was shown behind its impo-
sition.4 The scope of this test for punishment was
limited, however, by the Court's holding that en-
suring the pretrial detainee's presence at trial was
not the only legitimate government objective and
that substantial deference must be given to the
prison administrator's judgment in determining
whether a restriction was rational. 5
The Court in Wolfish addressed five practices by
prison officials that had been challenged by pretrial
detainees. The detainees complained that they
were being housed by twos in cells designed for one
person.6 In addition, detainees were prohibited
from receiving hardcover books from sources other
than publishers or book clubs7 and could not re-
ceive any packages except for one at Christmas.
8
Finally, the prison administrators were searching
the pretrial detainees' cells in their absence, and
the detainees were subjected to body-cavity
searches after they had visits where they were not
' 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
2 These persons are referred to as pretrial detainees.
Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1977),
defendants are to be detained only if no less drastic means
exist to ensure their presence at trial. However, Justice
Marshall points out in his dissent: "[Situdies indicate
that bail determinations frequently do not focus on the
individual defendant but only on the nature of the crime
charged and that, as administered, the system penalizes
indigent defendants." 99 S. Ct. at 1887 n.1 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
399 S. Ct. at 1872.
4 Id. at 1874.
5 Id. at 1874, 1875 n.23.
6 Subsequently referred to as double ceiling.
7 Subsequently referred to as the publisher-only rule.
8 Subsequently referred to as the single-package rule.
separated from visitors by a partition. All five
practices were alleged to violate the detainees' due
process right to liberty. The publisher-only rule,
the single-package rule, the cell searches, and the
body-cavity searches also were alleged to violate
specific constitutional guarantees other than the
due process clause. Applying the appropriate tests
for these additional guarantees, the Court found
that the four practices did not violate the relevant
constitutional provisions.? The Court then applied
its "punishment" standard to all of the practices
and ruled that the pretrial detainees' right to lib-
erty had not been violated.1'
I
The action in Wolfish was brought to contest
conditions at the Metropolitan Correction Center
(MCC), a federally operated detention facility in
New York City." When MCC opened in 1975 "it
represented the architectural embodiment of the
best and most progressive penological planning."'
2
However, shortly after the facility opened, there
was a substantial increase in the number of pretrial
detainees which resulted in overcrowding of the
inmates."3 In November 1975, less than four
months after MCC opened, the action in Wolfish
was brought by writ of habeas corpus.'
4
The district court awarded the inmates relief
from four practices on-cross motions for summary
judgment.'5 Several additional practices were
999 S. Ct. at 1880, 1882, 1883, 1885.
'Old. at 1875-76, 1886.
" See id. at 1866.
12 Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1978).
3 99 S. Ct. at 1867.
14 Id. The Supreme Court indicated that the issue of
using a writ of habeas corpus to challenge confinement
conditions was not before it and therefore the Court did
not rule on the issue. Id. at 1867 n.6.
I5 The court prohibited double ceiling and struck down
the publisher-only rule and the confiscation of property
from a pretrial detainee without providing a receipt.
In addition, the court held that inmates could seal
outgoing mail subject only to electronic inspection or
opening of it only if probable cause could be shown;
incoming legal mail could be searched without good
cause but only in the inmate's presence; and incoming
nonlegal mail could be searched without good cause
outside the inmate's presence, but it could be read only
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struck down after trial." Some of the practices
were ordered discontinued as arbitrary and capri-
cious administrative restrictions, and therefore pro-
hibited by the Administrative Procedure Act.1
7
Most of the practices, however, were struck down
because they violated the due process clause. The
district court found that, to protect the pretrial
detainees' right to liberty, it was necessary to pro-
hibit any restriction which went beyond the mini-
mum necessary to confine the detainees unless the
restriction was justified as a "compelling neces-
sity.:)1
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the
Administrative Procedure Act did not give the
district court the authority to strike down restric-
tions using an arbitrary and capricious standard.
The court ruled that under the Bureau of Prisons
Act, Congress gave the Attorney General final
discretion in administering prisons.' 9 The portion
of the district court's ruling that conflicted with
that authority was reversed.20 The majority of the
rest of the lower court's opinion was affirmed by
the appellate court. 2' To ensure that pretrial de-
il those conditions were met. See United States cx re.
Wolfish v. Levi, 428 F. Supp. 333, 343-44 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
16 The district court ordered relief on the issues of
classification of inmates, length of confinement, special
diets for Muslims, access to law libraries, typewriter
possession, commissary procedures, overcrowding, visit-
ing hours, locking of the visitors' bathrooms, attorney
visits, codefendant visits,.telephone service, forwarding of
mail, body-cavity searches, room searches, confiscation of
inmate property, rules on receiving packages, uniforms,
food preparation, and procedures for guards to follow
when dealing with members of the opposite sex. See
United States ex re. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
17 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
18439 F. Supp. at 124.
19 573 F.2d at 125; see 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1976). The
Administrative Procedure Act states that an agency ac-
tion is not reviewable if the action "is committed to
agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1976).
2o The court of appeals ruled that there was no au-
thority to intervene on the issues of locking the visitors'
bathroom, telephone service, visiting hours, and commis-
sary procedures. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 125-26
& n.16 (2d Cir. 1978).
21 After determining that prison administrators had a
legitimate security interest that justified the requirement
that the detainees wear uniforms and the restriction
preventing them from owning typewriters, the appellate
court reversed the district court's ruling on those issues.
Id. at 132, 133.
The court of appeals remanded for reconsideration of
the holdings limiting an inmate's stay at MCC to no
more than 60 days and limiting the number of occupants
in the dormitory to 10. The court also remanded for
tainees were treated as innocent until proven
guilty, the court of appeals found that under the
due process clause "pretrial detainees may be sub-
jected to only those 'restrictions and privations'
which 'inhere in their confinement itself or are
justified by compelling necessities of jail adminis-
tration.' "2
II
The Supreme Court in Wolfish rejected the
"compelling necessity" standard used by the court
of appeals and the district court. The Court held
that the lower courts' reliance on the presumption
of innocence as the source of the pretrial detainees'
right to be free from restrictions was misplaced
because the presumption of innocence was only a
burden of proof standard in criminal trials.23 While
noting that the presumption had an important role
in the criminal justice system, the Court indicated
that it was inapplicable to the determination of
pretrial detainees' rights and could not support the
compelling necessity standard."4
The general standard introduced by the Court
to protect pretrial detainees' right to liberty pro-
hibited any restriction which constituted punish-
ment of the detainee.s2 The Court found that the
government had.the authority to detain a person
to ensure his presence at trial, but it did not have
the authority to punish him prior to an adjudica-
tion of guilt.26 While acknowledging that detention
itself resulted in a loss of choice and privacy, the
Court found that these losses were not punish-
ment.
27
To determine whether a condition or restriction
experienced by a pretrial detainee constituted pun-
ishment, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the major-
ity, indicated that the appropriate test would be
the one used in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Marline "zs to
reconsideration tne district court's ruling prohibiting
double ceiling of convicted inmates because the court
found that there was a lesser standard of constitutional
protection for convicted prisoners. Id. at 127, 129.
2 Id. at 124, (quoting Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333,
336 (2d Cir. 1974)).
2 99 S. Ct. at 1870.
24 1d. at 1871.5 Id. at 1871, 1872.26 Id. at 1872. The Court noted that it did not mean
to overrule historical exceptions to the rule that punish-
ment can only follow a finding of guilt by trial or a plea.
An example of such an exception is the power to punish
for contempt of court without a trial. Id. at 1872 n.17.
7Id. at 1873.
28 372 U.S. 144 (1963). The statute in Mendoza-Marlinez
provided that persons who crossed the border to evade
1979)
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determine if a statute was punitive. The test, as set
out in Kennedy, required inquiry into
"[wlhether the sanction involves an affirmative dis-
ability or restraint, whether it has historically been
regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into
play only on a finding of scienter, whether its opera-
tion will promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence, whether the be-
havior to which it applies is already a crime, whether
an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it. and whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose as-
signed are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often
point in differing directions.2 ''
After reciting this test, Justice Rehnquist pro-
vided a summation of it. He stated that a condition
or restriction did not constitute punishment if there
was no showing of a punitive intent behind its
imposition and if the restriction was rationally
related to a legitimate government objective.30 In
determining whether a restriction met the rational
relationship test, Rehnquist indicated that defer-
ence should be given to the judgment of prison
administrators.3 ' Rehnquist's summation of the
Mendoza-Martinez test is significant because it omits
several of the factors of the original test and pro-
vides a much narrower definition of punishment.
Utilizing this new standard, the first condition
which the Court examined was the practice of
double ceiling. The Court's analysis of this issue is
confusing because they did not cite any of the
Mendoza-Martinez factors nor did they attempt to
show that the practice was a rational response to a
legitimate government objective. Rather, it distin-
guished the more modern conditions found at
MCC from the conditions in cases dealing with
older, traditional jails where lower courts had ruled
certain minimum space standards were required. 2
Acknowledging that severe overcrowding for an
extended length of time might amount to punish-
ment, the Court nevertheless ruled that because
the pretrial detainees at MCC were only in their
cells seven hours a day and nearly all of them were
the draft were automatically divested of their citizenship.
The Court ruled that this statute was unconstitutional
because the forfeiture of citizenship in this context was
punishment which was inflicted without due process of
law. Id. at 167-70.
29 99 S. Ct. at 1873 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U. S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted)).
3" 99 S. Ct. at 1873-74.
31 Id. at 1875 n.23.
' Id. at 1876 & n.27.
released within sixty days, the practice of double
ceiling was not unconstitutional.33
The Court next addressed the four challenged
security measures. Unlike double ceiling, these
practices were alleged to violate other specific con-
stitutional guarantees in addition to the due proc-
ess clause. It was therefore necessary to apply the
appropriate tests to determine whether the restric-
tions violated either the specific constitutional pro-
visions invoked or the due process clause. Before
applying the tests, however, the Court noted that
in its cases involving the rights of convicted inmates
it had established principles for dealing with re-
strictions that were alleged to violate specific con-
stitutional guarantees. The Court had held that
convicted inmates retained some rights, but those
rights were limited because of the inmates' incar-
ceration. Therefore, restrictions which infringed
constitutional guarantees had to be balanced
against the prison administrator's objective of
maintaining security. Furthermore, deference was
to be afforded to prison administrators in this
balancing process. The Court held that these prin-
ciples now applied to pretrial detainees also.a
5
Using these principles, the majority found that
the four security practices did not violate the con-
stitutional guarantees which they were alleged to
infringe. Noting that the publisher-only rule oper-
ated without regard to the content of the pro-
hibited books and that there were alternative ways
of obtaining reading material, the Court held that
the rule was a rational response to a legitimate
security problem and did not violate the first
amendment.'s Holding that the court of appeals
had improperly substituted its judgment for that
of the prison administrators in determining that
a Id. at 1876. Although the average stay at the deten-
tion facility was only 60 days and the named plaintiffs
had left the institution, the Court ruled that the case was
not moot because there was still a live controversy be-
tween the administrators and the remaining members of
the class. Because of the short average stay in the insti-
tution, the Court noted that this was a case which could
be repeated but would never be reviewed if it was re-
quired that the named plaintiffs still be in the institution.
Id. at 1867 n.5. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
110 n.II (1975). Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-25
(1973) (pregnancy litigation will survive beyond length
of gregnancy).
99 S. Ct. at 1877 (citing Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977); Mea-
chum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976); Wolff v. Mc-
Donnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
' 99 S. Ct. at 1877, 1878.
6 Id. at 1880-8 1.
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packages were not a sanitary and security problem,
the Court ruled that the single-package rule was
rational and did not violate the protection of prop-
erty under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.37 Finally, the Court held that the cell
and body-cavity searches were not unreasonable
and did not violate the fourth amendment pro-
scription of unreasonable searches and seizures be-
cause the serious security concerns of prison admin-
istrators outweighed the pretrial detainees' dimin-
ished expectation of privacy.s
The Court next applied the due process standard
it had developed to the four security practices. If
the practices constituted punishment, they would
violate the pretrial detainees' right to liberty under
the due process clause even though they did not
violate any other specific constitutional guarantee.
The Court found, however, that the four practices
were not the equivalent of punishment because
they were rational responses to the legitimate se-
curity objectives of the prison.
39
FourJustices dissented from the majority's opin-
ion. Justice Powell dissented only on the issue of
body-cavity searches. Viewing the practice as a
serious intrusion on the inmates' privacy, Powell
indicated that he would require a showing of a
reasonable suspicion before allowing the searches."
Justice Marshall dissented vigorously, arguing
that the majority's "punishment standard" was
inappropriate. He did not think it was helpful to
claim to protect a pretrial detainee from punish-
ment when, in his view, pretrial incarceration alone
was indistinguishable from punishment.4 ' The test
the majority used to determine whether a restric-
tion was punishment was also faulty according to
Justice Marshall. He argued that by omitting sev-
eral factors in its restatement of the Mendoza-Mar-
Iinez test "the Court contracts a broad standard
sensitive to the deprivations imposed on detainees,
into one that seeks merely to sanitize official mo-
tives and prohibit irrational behavior."
42
In Justice Marshall's view, the proper standard
for determining whether a restriction or condition
violated the due process clause would be a balanc-
ing of the governmental interests served against the
individual deprivations suffered.43 In applying a
balancing test to the challenged practices, he in-
Id. at 1882.
38 Id. at 1883, 1885.
39 Id. at 1886.40 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 1889 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 1887.
43Id. at 1891.
dicated that he would remand to the lower court
the decision on double ceiling because that issue
had been decided on summary judgment without
giving the government sufficient opportunity to
express its need for the practice." Because the four
security practices infringed on fundamental rights
guaranteed by specific constitutional provisions,
under a balancing test they needed to be justified
by a compelling governmental interest. Marshall
indicated that the government had failed to meet
this burden and, therefore, he would affirm the
court of appeals decision concerning those four
practices.45
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, also
dissented. While agreeing with the majority that
the due process clause protects a pretrial detainee
from punishment, 46 Justice Stevens found the
Court's test for punishment defective. He argued
that the requirement that a restriction merely have
a rational basis provided little protection against
punishment. He also argued that a restriction could
be punitive without a showing of punitive intent.
47
Thus, Justice Stevens considered the majority's test
for punishment to be too permissive.8
A more appropriate test for punishment in Jus-
tice Steven's view would "allow a court to infer
that punishment has been inflicted by evaluating
objective criteria."4 9 The criteria that he developed
required an examination of whether the restriction
involved an actual restraint of the pretrial detainee
which had historically been considered punish-
ment, whether there was a classification system to
separate more dangerous detainees from those who
were less dangerous, and whether there was a
significant disparity between the harm to the de-
tainee and the importance of the government ob-
jective served by the restriction.5
Using his criteria for punishment, Justice Ste-
vens indicated that he would remand the question
of double ceiling to the lower courts because it had
been decided on summary judgment and there
were insufficient facts from which to determine
whether it was a punishment.5 ' He would, however,
have affirmed the court of appeals ruling striking
down the four security restrictions since each one
4id.
4 Id. at 1892-94.46 1d. at 1895 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4'Id. at 1898.
43 Id.
4 Id. at 1899.
50 Id.
5' Id. at 1903-04.
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of the restrictions constituted punishment under
his objective criteria test.
52
III
The Supreme Court used an ineffective standard
in Wolfish that does not provide adequate protec-
tion of the rights of pretrial detainees. The Court
found that the presumption of innocence was in-
applicable to the determination of the rights of
pretrial detainees because it was only a burden of
proof standard for criminal trials. This ruling se-
verely limits the protection provided by the pre-
sumption of innocence.
An examination of the cases cited by the Court
as support for its rejection of the presumption of
innocence rule in this situation reveals that the
issues involved in those cases were completely un-
related to the question of whether the presumption
of innocence provided any protection of pretrial
detainees' rights.s3 For example, the issue in In re
Winship was whether a criminal conviction based
on a preponderance of the evidence standard was
valid. The Court reversed the conviction and found
that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt to comply with the due process clause. The
issue in Estelle v. Williamsss was whether allowing
a defendant to stand trial while wearing a prison
uniform undermined the presumption of innocence
and the requirement that guilt be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. The Court refused to reverse
the conviction because the defendant had failed to
object at trial and there was no evidence that he
was compelled to wear the uniform.
Finally, in Taylor v. Kentuckys the issue was
whether a conviction was improper where the trial
court refused to instruct the jury on the presump-
tion of innocence after it had instructed them on
the reasonable doubt standard for the burden of
proof. Acknowledging that the presumption and
the reasonable doubt standards were "logically
similar,"57 the Court held, nevertheless, that the
jury should have been instructed on both principles
to overcome an inference of guilt left by the pros-
ecutor's closing remarks. The examination of these
cases shows that all three were limited to questions
of whether a defendant had been granted sufficient
r2 Id. at 1903.
:'See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978); Estelle
v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970).
"4 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
"" 425 U.S. at 512-13.
56 436 U.S. at 479.
57 Id. at 484, 490.
protection of his rights with regard to presumption
of innocence at trial.
Because Winship, Estelle, and Taylor dealt only
with defendants' rights at trial, there was no reason
for the Court in deciding them to discuss whether
the presumption of innocence provided any protec-
tion of pretrial detainees' rights in confinement.
There is certainly no reason to infer from the
Court's failure to discuss the issue in those cases
that it was limiting the presumption of innocence
to protecting defendants' rights only at trial. The
Supreme Court in Wolfish appears to make that
inference, however, and relies on it to support its
ruling that the presumption of innocence provides
no protection of the rights of pretrial detainees.
Because the inference is unsound, the Court's rul-
ing is left without satisfactory support.
The question in Wolfish concerns what protec-
tion should be afforded citizens who are incarcer-
ated while awaiting trial. The source of the protec-
tion of these citizens is the fifth amendment, which
clearly states that "[no person shall be... deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.' 'ss Any decision concerning the rights of pre-
trial detainees must turn on an interpretation of
this amendment and not on an interpretation of
the presumption of innocence. Thus, the Court's
discussion of the presumption of innocence is essen-
tially irrelevant.
Because of the unsatisfactory support the Court
in Wolfish offers for its rejection of the compelling
necessity standard, it is proper to reconsider the
appropriateness of that standard. The compelling
necessity standard was not a creation of the Wolfish
lower courts. The Supreme Court has used such a
standard in examining state statutes which are
alleged to infringe on the fundamental rights of
citizens.
Two cases illustrate the Court's use of a compel-
ling necessity standard. In Roe v. Wade,5" the Court
examined a state statute prohibiting abortion. The
statute was alleged to violate the due process clause
because of its invasion of a woman's fundamental
right to privacy. Explaining its due process stan-
dard, the Court indicated that "[w]here certain
'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has
held that regulation limiting these rights may be
justified only by a 'compelling state interest."'60
The statute was struck down because the state's
interest in protecting the mother's health and the
5 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.




life of the fetus did not become sufficiently com-
pelling to overcome a woman's right to privacy
until after the end of the first trimester.6 '
In Bales v. City of Little Rock,e2 the Court addressed
a state statute requiring the NAACP to disclose its
membership list. Because the state's interest in
determining the membership of the organization
was not compelling enough to outweigh the in-
fringement on the members' right of association,
the statute was struck down as violative of due
process.'3 As these cases indicate, a compelling
necessity test is appropriate when fundamental
rights of ordinary citizens are infringed. 8
Because the Court has used the compelling ne-
cessity standard in examining infringements of fun-
damental rights, it would be consistent to apply
this standard in examining infringements on the
fundamental rights of unconvicted citizens who are
incarcerated while awaiting trial. An examination
of the appellate court cases that have applied the
compelling necessity standard indicates that the
standard is sensitive to protecting the rights of
these pretrial detainees. In Campbell v. McGruder,"
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recog-
nized that the government had a legitimate secu-
rity interest in ensuring the detainees' presence at
trial, but held that the pretrial detainee had a right
to be free from punishment. Finding that confine-
ment was indistinguishable from punishment, the
court held that each additional restriction in-
creased the severity of the punishment and, there-
fore, needed to be justified as a "substantial neces-
sity" of jail administration.66 Using this standard,
the court found that overcrowding of detainees was
unconstitutional and affirmed several injunctive
orders offering relief to pretrial detainees.67 This
case shows how a court can use the compelling
necessity standard to ensure that additional liberty
rights of pretrial detainees are not infringed with-
out good reason.
1 Id. at 162-63.
2361 U.S. 516 (1960).
63 Id. at 524, 527.
6 See generally Note, Of Interests Fundamental and Compel-
ling: The Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57 B.U.L. REV.
462 (1977).
c580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
6 Id. at 531.
6id. at 540, 551-52. The injunctions required that
pretrial detainees be provided clean clothing and bed
linen, that a security classification system be established
to prevent excessively harsh confinement and allow con-
tact visits, that procedures be developed for the psychi-
atric examination and transfer of mentally ill detainees,
and that procedures for the use of physical restraints be
developed. Id. at 544, 548, 550, 551.
Norris v. Frame68 demonstrates how the compel-
ling necessity standard protects liberty rights of
pretrial detainees which prison administrators
might not be inclined to preserve. In Norris, the
court of appeals reversed a district court dismissal
of a suit in which it was alleged that the refusal of
the jail administration to allow a pretrial detainee
to continue in an approved methadone treatment
program violated the detainee's right to liberty.
The court held that because the detainee had
established a liberty interest in his continuance in
the treatment program, the jail administrators
would have to justify the deprivation of this liberty
by showing that it was necessary for proper jail
administration.69 Thus the compelling necessity
standard used in Norris ensured that liberty enjoyed
by the citizen before he was detained could not be
removed simply because a jail administrator did
not feel it was worthy of protection.
As Campbell and Norris indicate, the compelling
necessity standard has much appeal. The standard
is consistent with the Court's approach in exam-
ining due process challenges to other regulations
which infringe on fundamental rights. In addition,
a compelling necessity test would ensure that the
pretrial detainee receives the same level of protec-
tion of rights which other unconvicted citizens are
provided by the due process clause. Although his
confinement would still be a significant depriva-
tion, the detainee would not be subjected to further
deprivations of the type to which a convicted per-
son might be subjected.
In contrast to the compelling necessity standard,
the punishment standard adopted by the Court in
Wolfish seems to make little distinction between the
protection provided pretrial detainees and the pro-
tection provided convicted persons by the due proc-
ess clause. The Court's punishment standard results
in a loss of virtually all additional liberty rights
once a citizen is detained. Further infringements
on his liberty only need be rationally related to a
legitimate government objective and no longer
need be justified by compelling government neces-
sity. As previously shown,70 the Court's attempt to
justify this lower standard of review, based on
relegating the presumption of innocence to a bur-
den of proof standard, is unsound.
In addition, when examining the specific consti-
tutional rights alleged to be infringed by the four
security restrictions, the Court actually cited its
68585 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir. 1978).
69Id. at 1189.7o See text accompanying notes 52-56 supra.
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cases dealing with convicted prisoners' rights as
support for the ruling that these specific constitu-
tional rights of pretrial detainees were also lim-
ited.71 It appears that the Court did not see the
need to provide any greater protection of pretrial
detainees' rights than it had provided convicted
prisoners' rights. An examination of some of the
Court's decisions on the rights of convicted pris-
oners demonstrates the limited protection afforded
their constitutional rights.
In Pell v. Procunier,72 inmates at a California
prison challenged a regulation prohibiting them
from having interviews with members of the news
media. Noting that incarceration properly put limi-
tations on the inmates' rights, the Court found that
the inmates' first amendment rights did not out--
weigh the prison administrator's security
interests. 73 In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union,74 inmates at a North Carolina prison chal-
lenged regulations which prevented them from
promoting their union. Again noting that incarcer-
ation limited the constitutional rights of prisoners,
the Court held that the prison administrator's se-
curity interest outweighed the limited first amend-
ment rights of the prisoners. 7 These cases illustrate
that even when dealing with fundamental first
amendment rights, the Court provides convicted
prisoners little protection from prison regulations.
The Court in Wolfish held that pretrial detainees
may not be punished, 76 yet it afforded them insuf-
ficient protection from punishment. The punish-
ment standard used by the Court provides the
detainee with less protection of liberty than is
granted an unincarcerated citizen by the compel-
ling necessity standard. The other constitutional
rights of detainees are subject to the same limita-
tions as the rights of convicted prisoners, even
though the detainees have not been convicted of
any crime. These limitations on the constitutional
rights of pretrial detainees are distressing because,
99 S. Ct. at 1877.
"417 U.S. 817, 819 (1974).
7'"We start with the familiar proposition that
"[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary with-
drawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a
retraction justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system."' Id. at 822-24 (quoting Price v. Johnston,
334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
74433 U.S. 119 (1977).
75 "In a prison context, an inmate does not retain those
First Amendment rights that are 'inconsistent with his
status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological
objectives ofthe corrections system."' Id. at 129-30 (quot-
ini.Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 822).
99 S. Ct. at 1872.
as Justice Stevens points out, "[t]he withdrawal of
rights is itself among the most basic punishments
that society can exact." 77 Thus, while claiming to
protect pretrial detainees from punishment, the
Court actually permits a withdrawal of the detai-
nees' rights which is in itself punishment.
The Court in Wolfish provides pretrial detainees
with only one protection which it does not provide
convicted inmates. Pretrial detainees may not be
subjected to restrictions on their liberty which are
imposed with a punitive intent. Even this protec-
tion is meager, however. As Justice Marshall
pointed out, the intent behind a restriction will not
be a matter of public record and the Court will
not be able to read a legislative history to determine
if the intent behind the restriction is punitive.7'
Furthermore, the Court is hesitant to infer a pu-
nitive intent from a restriction. While noting that
throwing a pretrial detainee in a dungeon would
be rationally related to the government objective
of ensuring the detainee's presence at trial, the
Court indicated that it would infer a punitive
intent from such a practice because of the many
less harsh alternatives available to achieve the same
purpose.79 Yet when the Court considered the sin-
gle-package rule, it refused to infer a punitive
intent even though it had been shown that less
harsh alternatives were used at other institutions.
8
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This inconsistency indicates that it will be difficult
to get the Court to infer a punitive intent from any
restriction.
If the punitive intent protection is difficult to
invoke, it is likely that pretrial detainees will be
subjected to the same restrictions as convicted in-
mates. The Court's holding in Wolfish that pretrial
detainees' rights are subject to the same limitations
as are convicted prisoners' rights is illogical. It
would seem to be generally accepted that incarcer-
ation and the restrictions inherent in it constitute
punishment of convicted prisoners. It is difficult,
therefore, to understand how the Court can find
that subjecting pretrial detainees to the same re-
strictions does not constitute punishment of them.
These restrictions do in fact constitute punishment,
and by allowing pretrial detainees to be subjected
to them, the Court is severely undermining the due
process clause. The unconvicted detainees are
being punished without due process of law.
77 Id. at 1900 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7" Id. at 1888 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7999 S. Ct. at 1874 n.20.




The result of Wolfish will probably be that pre-
trial detainees' rights are afforded no more protec-
tion than convicted inmates' rights, but it may be
possible to limit the effects of the decision. One
possible way to limit Wolfish is to distinguish it on
its facts. The institution involved in Wolfish had
been recently constructed and was quite modern
in design. The Court noted this and indicated that
cases which dealt with older, traditional jails were
inapplicable because of the factual distinction.8' It
is difficult to understand why the Court did not
overrule some of those cases because they addressed
the rights of pretrial detainees and turned on stan-
dards different than the one the Court rejected and
not on their facts. 2 Nevertheless, because the Court
did not overrule them, pretrial detainees in other
actions may be able to argue that the conditions at
the facilities where they are detained constitute
punishment because the jails are old and poorly
maintained.
It also may be possible to limit the scope of the
Court's decision on double ceiling. The Court ac-
knowledged that overcrowding for an extended
length of time might constitute punishmentss but
found that double ceiling at MCC was not uncon-
stitutional because the detainees were not kept in
their cells or in the institution very long. Pretrial
detainees who are subjected to double or triple
ceiling for an extended period of time might be
able to argue that they are being punished. Unfor-
tunately, the Court was unclear about exactly what
standard it was applying when it decided the dou-
ble ceiling issue, so it is difficult to predict what
standard it would apply to another overcrowding
81 The Court distinguished Campbell v. McGruder,
580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that overcrowding
constituted punishment in violation of detainees' due
process rights); Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th
Cir. 1977) (overcrowding of convicted prisoners violated
eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment); Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007
(S.D. Ohio 1977) (overcrowding of convicted prisoners
constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D.
Mass. 1973) (the totality of conditions constituted pun-
ishment of pretrial detainees in violation of due process
clause).
' See Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360
F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973). Both cases employed a
balancing test similar to the compelling necessity stan-
dard.
8 99 S. Ct. at 1875.
argument or what the chances of success of such
an argument might be.
It might be possible to argue that there is a
punitive intent behind a restriction if less harsh
alternatives are available to accomplish the same
purpose. As discussed earlier,"' however, the success
of this argument is questionable. The chances of
success may be increased by bringing in a prison
administrator to testify to the availability of less
harsh alternatives to the challenged restriction.
This tactic might provide an effective counter to
the deference otherwise given to the administrator
whose practices are being challenged. The chances
of success may be increased still more if it can be
shown that actual harm to the detainee results
from the practice.
Restrictions of pretrial confinement that are al-
leged to violate specific constitutional provisions
other than the due process clause protection of
liberty must be subjected to the standard of review
appropriate to those specific provisions. If the prac-
tices fail the tests of the specific constitutional
provisions, the restrictions must be struck down
even though they may have been permissible under
the Court's more lenient due process standard.
Unfortunately, protecting pretrial detainees' rights
under the standards of the relevant constitutional
provisions will be more difficult because the Court
in WolfUsh held that these rights are limited upon
incarceration8s even though the detainee has not
been convicted of a crime.
CONCLUSION
The protection afforded pretrial detainees' rights
by the Wolfish decision is insufficient. The Court
now permits the fundamental rights of unconvicted
citizens to be severely limited. This limitation of
rights is an infliction of punishment without due
process of law because the detainee has not yet
been convicted of a crime, but it is permissible
under the Court's ineffective standard. Because it
may be possible to limit Wolfish, the full effect of
the decision will not be known until more chal-
lenges to the conditions of pretrial confinement are
brought. It seems probable, however unfortunate,
that in the future the rights of pretrial detainees
will be afforded no greater protection than the
rights of convicted prisoners.
' See text accompanying note 78 supra.
85 99 S. Ct. at 1878.
